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A Commentary on Professor Shen’s Aging Judges  
MORRIS B. HOFFMAN* 
Let me begin this discussion of Francis Shen’s thought-provoking look at 
Aging Judges1 with two disclosures. First, Francis and I are friends, colleagues, 
and co-authors. We met in 2009, when I was a member and Francis a fellow in 
the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation’s Law and Neuroscience 
Project.2 We have since collaborated on many things, including co-authoring a 
book, several law review articles, and one science paper.3 
Second, and I think much more important in terms of driving this 
commentary, I am an aged judge. I was appointed to the Colorado state trial 
bench in 1990 at the age of thirty-eight, which as far as I know is still a record 
for youngest appointment on my bench. I am now sixty-seven, the second oldest 
judge on my bench.4 So I think I have some perspective to bring to this topic, 
not only as an old judge but also as a once very young one. 
I divide my comments into three parts: first, a listing of what I found to be 
some of the most intriguing and sometimes surprising descriptive aspects of this 
piece, which I use largely to illustrate that I agree with Professor Shen that 
cognitive disability among judges is a growing problem that needs attention; 
second, a discussion of whether Shen’s proposed remedy is feasible (spoiler 
alert: I think it is, and, with some specific suggestions about how it could be 
presented and to whom, I think it could be made even more feasible); and, 
finally, some thoughts about where I think the proposal needs more attention to 
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D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Network on Law and Neuroscience; Research 
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 1 Francis X. Shen, Aging Judges, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 235 (2020). 
 2 There were two iterations of these efforts. The first was called the “Law and 
Neuroscience Project.” It was a five-year grant that began in 2008 and was headed by 
Michael S. Gazzaniga from the University of California Santa Barbara. The second was a 
three-year grant called “The Research Network on Law and Neuroscience,” which began in 
2014 and was headed by Owen D. Jones, from Vanderbilt. Francis began as a fellow in the 
first phase and ended up directing the network’s educational and outreach program in the 
second phase. For a history of these efforts, the participants, and a searchable bibliography 
of its published research, see The MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and 
Neuroscience, VAND. U., https://www.lawneuro.org [https://perma.cc/NW8M-R75Y]. 
 3 OWEN D. JONES ET AL., BRAIN SCIENCE FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES (forthcoming); 
Matthew R. Ginther et al., Essay, Decoding Guilty Minds: How Jurors Attribute Knowledge 
and Guilt, 71 VAND. L. REV. 241 (2018); Matthew R. Ginther et al., Parsing the Behavioral 
and Brain Mechanisms of Third-Party Punishment, 36 J. NEUROSCIENCE 9420 (2016); 
Matthew R. Ginther et al., The Language of Mens Rea, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1327 (2014); 
Morris B. Hoffman et al., The Intersectionality of Age and Gender on the Criminal Bench: 
Are Younger Female Judges Harsher with Serious Crimes?, COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 
(forthcoming); Francis X. Shen et al., Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306 (2011). 
 4 Colorado has mandatory judicial retirement at age 72. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 23(1). 
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detail and how it might be too timid in one dimension and too aggressive in 
another. 
I. I DIDN’T KNOW THAT! 
This article is chock full of tidbits that will interest just about everyone, 
whether you are an ordinary citizen worried about the trajectory of your own 
abilities as you age, a public policy wonk thinking about whether, and how, 
society should use age as a proxy for ability, a concerned lawyer worried about 
that ancient judge you just drew for your career case, or a co-worker wondering 
how to tell an old colleague that they have lost it. 
Despite spending the last twelve years at this intersection of law and 
neuroscience, there were lots of things about the neuroscience of aging and 
cognition that were new to me and that bear directly on this issue of aging judges 
(and, really, aging workers of any kind). 
I did not know that some kinds of dementia, including Alzheimer’s, begin 
with a long period of brain changes before the disease is at all symptomatic.5 
That means that if these early brain changes could be reliably detected (and 
some of them can be detected today, and no doubt more will be detectable in the 
future as diagnostics advance) we would have a reliable way of identifying 
judges (and others) who should at least be thinking about retiring, not to mention 
interventions to try to slow or manage the coming loss. 
I did not know that age and cognition researchers have identified a small 
percentage of people they have labelled “Super Agers,” who for reasons that are 
still unknown, experience little or no cognitive decline and maintain their mental 
faculties at high levels into very old age.6 
I did not know that some psychologists distinguish between what they call 
“fluid intelligence” and “crystallized intelligence.”7 Researchers describe “fluid 
intelligence” as something akin to what cognitive neuroscientists might call 
processing speed and pattern recognition.8 Crystallized intelligence, by contrast, 
is more akin to judgment or wisdom.9 A study showed that, on average, fluid 
intelligence peaks at adolescence, then begins to decline in early adulthood, with 
even more rapid and continuing decline after age fifty-five.10 But crystallized 
intelligence remains rather constant, or perhaps even slightly increases, until 
around the age of sixty, when it begins to decline but only very slowly.11 
I had also not heard about this idea of “cognitive reserve,” which 
neuroscientists have posited allows individuals facing neurodegenerative loss to 
 
 5 See Shen, supra note 1, at 256 (citation omitted). 
 6 Id. at 252 (citations omitted); see infra text accompanying note 25 (discussing federal 
Judge Jack Weinstein, who surely must be one of these Super Agers). 
 7 Shen, supra note 1, at 249 (citation omitted). 
 8 Id. (citation omitted).  
 9 Id. (citation omitted).  
 10 Id. at 250 (citation omitted). 
 11 Id. (citation omitted).   
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recruit other less diminished regions to work around the loss.12 Older brains can 
often solve the same problems as younger ones, and sometimes even in the same 
or shorter amounts of time, but they often use different pathways to do so.13 
I knew aging was generally associated with losing brain connectivity in the 
cortex (the wrinkly outer layer of the human brain), and that this is called the 
“cortical disconnection hypothesis” of cognitive aging.14 But I did not know that 
this loss of cortical connectivity occurs quite irregularly across the cortex,15 with 
some regions suffering dramatic age-related losses16 (including the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, a region closely associated with high order reasoning, such as 
making judgments about punishment)17 but others largely unaffected18 
(including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, a region associated with the 
detection of emotions in others, such as assessing the harm one person has 
inflicted on another in a criminal context).19 
You probably knew that cognitive functioning is so individualized that 
using age as a proxy for it will often be more wrong than right.20 Shen includes 
the example of the relatively young judge with tragically early dementia,21 as 
well as the example of the ninety-six year old judge who is still going strong.22 
 
 12 Id. at 252 (citation omitted). 
 13 Shen, supra note 1, at 254; see Jeff Grabmeier, Elderly Can Be as Fast as Young in 
Some Brain Tasks, Study Shows, SCIENCEDAILY (Dec. 31, 2011), https://www.science 
daily.com/releases/2011/12/111227142535.htm [https://perma.cc/85F2-NGVA]. 
 14 Shen, supra note 1, at 254 n.119 (citation omitted). 
 15 Id. at 253–54. 
 16 Max Toepper et al., The Impact of Age on Load-Related Dorsolateral Prefrontal 
Cortex Activation, FRONTIERS AGING NEUROSCIENCE, Feb. 2014, at 1−2, 6, https://www 
.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3913830/pdf/fnagi-06-00009.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
8FY2-ZG5H].  
 17 Frank Krueger & Morris Hoffman, The Emerging Neuroscience of Third-Party 
Punishment, 39 TRENDS NEUROSCIENCE 499, 500–01 (2016). 
 18 Shen, supra note 1, at 254; see Nichole R. Lighthall et al., Functional Compensation 
in the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Improves Memory-Dependent Decisions in Older 
Adults, 34 J. NEUROSCIENCE 15648−49, 15652 (2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
pmc/articles/PMC4236396/pdf/zns15648.pdf [https://perma.cc/MH7Z-BB7H].  
 19 Krueger & Hoffman, supra note 17, at 500; Shen, supra note 1, at 254; see Janelle 
N. Beadle et al., Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Is Critical for Helping Others Who Are 
Suffering, FRONTIERS NEUROLOGY, May 2018, at 1−2, 9, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ 
PMC5981225/pdf/fneur-09-00288.pdf [https://perma.cc/RWA5-J3TK].  
 20 See Shen, supra note 1, at 281. 
 21 Id. at 282–83. 
 22 Id. at 281. On the “still going strong” side of this ledger, Shen reports on Jack 
Weinstein, the legendary trial judge from the Eastern District of New York. Id. I have my 
own Jack Weinstein story. Several years ago, I published an article in the Duke Law Journal 
calling for a return to jury sentencing. See generally Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury 
Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951 (2003). Judge Weinstein cited that article in an opinion he 
wrote in which he discussed at length the relationship between judge and jury in criminal 
cases. United States v. Khan, 325 F. Supp. 2d 218, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). Eight years later, 
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But did you know that the already wide individual variance in cognitive function 
increases as we age?23 That means that as age proxies go up, which is the trend 
as advocates and other well-intentioned people raise mandatory retirement 
ages,24 in some sense we get the worst of both worlds. We are still using a very 
blunt instrument, age, to separate people who are increasingly cognitively 
diverse as they age.25 
Did you know that the average age of federal judges is sixty-nine,26 five to 
seven years beyond when the average American retires?27 That is an amazing 
statistic, which by itself suggests that we should be thinking hard about the 
problem of aging judges. Due in large part to the advent of the senior status 
program, the vast majority of federal judges end up taking senior status rather 
than retiring or resigning.28 There are currently eleven federal circuit and federal 
district court judges over age ninety who still hear cases.29 An astonishing 75% 
of federal judges leave the bench because they die.30 I challenge anyone to 
identify a profession whose average age exceeds the average retirement age, 
with active ninety-year-old practitioners, and whose primary method of job 
separation is death.31 
I did not know that the United States Supreme Court fought its own internal 
battle over what to do about Justice William Douglas, after he had a debilitating 
stroke in 1974 but refused to step down.32 An almost unanimous Court (all but 
Justice Byron White) agreed it would not allow Justice Douglas to cast any 
decisive vote, including votes on petitions for certiorari.33 
 
he sent me a lovely handwritten note about the article. He was ninety-one years old at the 
time. 
 23 Shen, supra note 1, at 281. 
 24 Id. at 238. 
 25 Id. at 238, 281. But see Alison Reynolds & David Lewis, Teams Solve Problems 
Faster When They’re More Cognitively Diverse, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 30, 2017), 
https://hbr.org/2017/03/teams-solve-problems-faster-when-theyre-more-cognitively-diverse 
[https://perma.cc/7LZ7-XVW3]. 
 26 Shen, supra note 1, at 242. 
 27 Id. The average retirement age for Americans is between sixty-two and sixty-four. 
Id. 
 28 Id. at 243–44. 
 29 Id. at 237 (citation omitted). 
 30 Id. at 243 (citation omitted). 
 31 State judges, by the way, are much younger, averaging 59.6 years old. Id. at 245 
(citation omitted). As Professor Shen points out, this lower average age for state judges is 
the result of many differences between the two systems, including: many states (thirty-two) 
have mandatory judicial retirement laws, but, as mentioned, the federal system does not; 
most states do not have a senior status system; and, perhaps most importantly, in state 
systems many lower level courts often serve as “entry level” judicial jobs, from which judges 
move on to higher state courts and to the federal district court. See id. Still, 22.6% of all state 
judges are between sixty-five and seventy-five. Id. 
 32 See id. at 270. 
 33 Id. at 270 n.267. 
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I did not know that Supreme Court Justices’ demonstrable “mental 
decrepitude,” as one researcher put it, has been a more significant problem in 
the twentieth century than in the nineteenth century.34 Maybe that should not be 
too surprising since our life expectancy has increased dramatically.35 But it 
looks like our cognitive expectancy, at least on the Supreme Court, has not kept 
pace.36 
Thirty-two states have mandatory judicial retirement statutes.37 I did not 
know that there have been several Congressional efforts to impose mandatory 
retirement for federal judges, all of which, interestingly, were coordinated by 
the American Bar Association, and all of which have failed.38 
There have been many iterations of the federal Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) when it comes to mandatory retirement.39 The first 
version in 1967 did not mention mandatory retirement at all, but it did prohibit 
discrimination in most private-sector employment against employees aged forty 
to sixty-five (thus, implicitly prohibiting mandatory retirement for employees 
age sixty-five and below and implicitly permitting it above age sixty-five).40 A 
1978 amendment explicitly outlawed mandatory retirement before age 
seventy,41 and a 1986 amendment explicitly outlawed all mandatory retirement 
at any age.42 Thus, for virtually the entire private sector Congress itself has made 
this difficult call between the benefits and costs of an age proxy by prohibiting 
all age proxies and requiring individualized evaluations.43 
A 1974 amendment extended the protections of the act to state employees, 
but the amendment exempted elected officials and their appointees using 
language that did not make it at all clear whether the exemption applied to 
 
 34 Id. at 269–70 (citing David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme 
Court: The Historical Case for a 28th Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 995, 1018 (2000)).  
 35 David Leonhardt, Life Expectancy Data, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2006), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2006/09/27/business/27leonhardt_sidebar.html [https://perma.cc/ 
38HX-DEPA]. 
 36 Although I wonder whether the advancing tools to demonstrate this “decrepitude,” 
not to mention the public’s interest in and the fourth estate’s willingness to probe such 
matters, have distorted this statistic. 
 37 Shen, supra note 1, at 245. 
 38 Id. at 278–80. As Professor Shen briefly notes, it is not at all clear that Congress 
would have the constitutional authority to impose a mandatory retirement age on federal 
judges, given that impeachment is arguably the exclusive method of removal. Id. at 309. 
 39 Id. at 276. 
 40 See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2, 81 
Stat. 602, 602. 
 41 Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 
§§ 2(a), 12(a), 92 Stat. 189, 189.  
 42 Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 
§ 2(c), 100 Stat. 3342, 3342. 
 43 See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 2(b) (“It is therefore the 
purpose of this Act to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather 
than age . . . .”).  
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appointed or retained state judges.44 In 1991, in Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Court 
held that this language was insufficiently clear to constitutionally apply to 
Missouri’s retained judges, and, therefore, that Missouri’s statute requiring 
judges to retire at age of seventy did not violate the ADEA.45 The Gregory Court 
also concluded that Missouri’s statute did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause because age is not a suspect classification and imposing an upper age 
limit for judges was rationally related to the legitimate state purpose of having 
a competent judiciary.46 
Shen tells us about a Michigan state judge, Michael Theile, who in 2018 
unsuccessfully challenged in federal court Michigan’s mandatory judicial 
retirement age of seventy, arguing, among other things, that Gregory should be 
overturned because in the intervening twenty-seven years many institutional 
methods have been developed that now allow an individual determination of a 
judge’s job performance, making any age proxy no longer rational.47 The federal 
trial judge and the Sixth Circuit rejected Judge Theile’s arguments,48 and he did 
not petition for certiorari. With the myriad of cognitive instruments now 
available to clinicians, plus perhaps even some biomarkers, Shen suggests that 
Judge Theile’s argument may well be getting stronger, and the continuing 
vitality of Gregory getting correspondingly weaker, as each year passes, and 
more individualized assessments become accepted.49 
All of these tidbits, plus a lot more, build an impressive case that judges as 
a group are simply getting too old too fast for the system to continue to ignore 
their declining cognitive abilities. Shen also persuasively argues that current 
methods to deal with this problem—incentives to tempt judges to retire 
sooner,50 informal cajoling by colleagues or chiefs,51 motions to disqualify by 
counsel,52 and even formal legislative action like the Federal Judicial Conduct 
 
 44 See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55. The 
language exempted:  
[A]ny person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State 
by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such 
officer’s personal staff, or an appointee on the policymaking level or an immediate 
adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. 
29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2012). 
 45 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 455, 467 (1991). 
 46 Id. at 470–73. 
 47 See Shen, supra note 1, at 278. 
 48 Theile v. Michigan, No. 17-CV-12066, 2017 WL 6504009, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 4, 
2017) (granting state’s motion to dismiss), aff’d, 891 F.3d 240, 241 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 49 See Shen, supra note 1, at 280–83. 
 50 Id. at 260–61. 
 51 Id. at 267–74. 
 52 Id. at 262–65. 
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and Disability Act of 198053—are simply too tame, too burdensome, too 
overinclusive, and/or too underinclusive to be effective solutions, especially 
compared to the neuropsychological instruments we currently have at our 
disposal to make reliable individualized judgments about a given judge’s 
cognitive ability.54 
No formal assessments are required under any of these traditional methods 
of dealing with cognitive judicial loss. Indeed, the only health assessments 
currently being done are done entirely at the front end of the process.55 Judicial 
nominees are typically required to self-report on a myriad of conditions, 
including several that are specifically psychological and neurological in 
nature.56 In addition to self-reporting, some nominating systems require 
physical examinations and that the results of those examinations be released to 
the nominating authorities.57 But all of this information, by self-report or 
 
 53 28 U.S.C. § 351–64 (2012); Shen, supra note 1, at 265–67. This Act, though mostly 
a procedural solution whose “sanctions” are generally informal, does contain sections that 
allow judicial councils to request that the Judicial Conference report a judge’s disability to 
the House of Representatives for possible impeachment. 28 U.S.C. § 355(b). A 2006 study 
of the Act commissioned by Chief Justice Roberts and performed by a group led by Justice 
Breyer found that a paltry 3.6% of formal complaints about federal judges were for mental 
or physical disability. Shen, supra note 1, at 267 n.238 (citing THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT & 
DISABILITY ACT STUDY COMM., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND 
DISABILITY ACT OF 1980: A REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 25 (2006), reprinted in 239 F.R.D. 
116 (2006)). The report’s findings were that:  
Table 5 indicates that misconduct allegations far outweighed disability allegations. Of 
the 5,227 allegations, only 190 (3.6%) were for conduct related to mental or physical 
disability. Among all allegations, by far the most common were charges of prejudice or 
bias (28.4%) and abuse of judicial power (23.4%), together constituting 52% (2,733 of 
5,277) of all allegations. The “other” category constitutes 17% (933) of the allegations. 
THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT & DISABILITY ACT STUDY COMM., supra note 53, at 25. Many states 
have similar legislatively created judicial conduct commissions. See generally Cynthia Gray, 
How Judicial Conduct Commissions Work, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 405 (2007) (describing judicial 
conduct commissions across the country).  
 54 See Shen, supra note 1, at 248–57. 
 55 Id. at 292–93. 
 56 Id.  
 57 See id. at 238; see also Rachel Brand, A Practical Look at Federal Judicial Selection, 
ADVOCATE, Winter 2010, at 82–83, http://www.wilmerhale.com/-/media/c0cacbde8df349 
52959403f3df1abbfe.pdf [https://perma.cc/46M9-Z7LZ]. For example, federal judicial 
candidates whose names are presented to the Senate by the candidate’s local senators are 
treated as presumptive nominees, about which the Senate begins to gather information long 
before any formal presidential nomination. Brand, supra note 57, at 82–83. As part of that 
information gathering, the Senate requires these presumptive nominees to take a 
comprehensive medical examination, and sign releases for those examinations. Id. at 83. 
Thus, we care about whether forty and fifty-year-old candidates for the federal judiciary are 
healthy, but not whether those same people, once appointed, are healthy, let alone think, 
when they are eighty.  
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otherwise, is only required of judicial nominees, not of sitting judges.58 What a 
crazy process! 
It is hard to deny, after reading Shen’s article, that there is a pressing need 
for individualized cognitive assessments of judges. Shen proposes a system in 
which judges, both state and federal, trial and appellate, are required to take 
cognitive health assessments over time (every five years), so that they 
themselves may have a better sense of whether they are suffering cognitive 
decline sufficient to step down voluntarily.59 Shen’s proposal has three 
significant elements: the assessments will be mandatory; they will be free to the 
judge; and their results will be confidential and shared only with the judge.60 Is 
this proposal feasible? 
II. SHEN’S PROPOSAL SEEMS FEASIBLE 
Precisely because the “system” we have now is really no system at all, I 
think Shen’s proposal is feasible in the sense that it should be attractive to the 
authorities charged with implementing and administering it, whether that be 
legislatures, chief judges, chief justices, or various kinds of judicial review 
commissions. Those authorities are already facing the delicate problem of the 
aging judge, but today they have virtually no tools at their disposal, either to 
protect judges from baseless claims of incompetence or to protect the public 
from truly incompetent judges. What these authorities desperately need is data, 
and what they have now is almost always just rumors and hearsay about 
anecdotes. 
Imagine a system in any labor sector where anyone is forced, or even just 
cajoled, to resign for non-cognitive health reasons—say, a nurse is suspected of 
having a deadly and highly contagious virus—but the evidence of the health 
problem is all anecdotal. “Janine just came back from China, and I saw her 
cough the other day, so I think she may have the coronavirus.” Supervisors who 
already have the unenviable task of making these decisions would welcome 
some actual data. 
Candidly, I think this system will be harder to sell to judges themselves than 
to their judicial administrators or legislatures. No one likes to be told he or she 
must submit to a medical examination, let alone a mental capacity examination. 
And by our very natures and institutional training, judges are fiercely 
independent creatures deeply committed to our own autonomy and openly 
hostile to any attempts by anyone to interfere with that autonomy. Many of us 
will also be resistant because these assessments, like making wills or buying life 
insurance, will force us to confront the fact of our own inevitable decline. That’s 
precisely why the assessments must be mandatory. 
 
 58 Shen, supra note 1, at 292–93. 
 59 Id. at 238. 
 60 Id. 
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One might be tempted as a tactical matter to jettison the requirement of 
mandatory assessments, even just on a trial basis, to make the program more 
palatable to judges. I think that would be a strategic mistake, and I was glad to 
see that Shen’s plan insists on mandatory assessments.61 Voluntary assessment 
is unlikely to generate enough participation to make the data valuable. Self-
selection will taint the numbers in any voluntary system.62 Most judges just will 
not bother with assessments until they have some reason to think they are 
suffering some cognitive losses, and then it might be too late to establish a 
meaningful baseline. Baselines are critical, because it is the trajectory from 
one’s individual baseline, and not where one compares with other judges at any 
point on that trajectory, that will have the most predictive value. 
In the end, I think judges may buy into a system like the one Shen proposes 
because we are more interested in the pace of our own decline than anyone else, 
and, with the right explanations, we will realize that, because there is so much 
individual variation in cognitive decline, the most critical measurement is 
change and to measure individual change we need a baseline and regular 
assessments. 
One other aspect of the proposal bears mentioning in the context of whether 
this can be sold to judges. We will be much more skeptical than the average 
person about promises to keep the results of our assessments confidential. After 
all, we are regularly asked to order the release of privileged or confidential 
information. No one knows better than judges that there is no such thing as 
inviolate privacy. As these systems get designed and presented, it will be 
paramount that the walls of privacy be made as high as possible,63 but it will 
also be paramount that privacy not be oversold to this audience of special 
skeptics. 
Finally, as I discuss in the next Part, widespread buy-in by judges may not 
be necessary if the right supervisory authority is selected—namely chief judges 
and chief justices. 
III. SUGGESTIONS 
There are four areas of Shen’s proposal that will require much more fleshing 
out, as he himself recognizes: the particular assessment tools to be included in 
the “cognitive toolbox;” the administrative structure of the proposal; and, related 
to that administrative structure, how the assessments will be paid for; and how 
they will be kept confidential. Let me briefly touch on each of these areas. 
Building these cognitive toolboxes will be extraordinarily challenging. 
“Cognition” is a single word that hides a large number of complex brain 
 
 61 Id. 
 62 Bias in Survey Sampling, STAT TREK, https://stattrek.com/survey-research/survey-
bias.aspx [https://perma.cc/65GB-ZWS9] (discussing the bias that occurs when sample 
members are self-selected). 
 63 But see discussion infra p. 16 (arguing there should be some limited exception to 
confidentiality for profoundly disabled judges). 
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functions and even more complex relationships between those functions, none 
of which is fully understood. Just in the category of “executive function”—
which psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists generally define as the set of 
processes that enable us to manage ourselves and our environment in a way that 
allows us to achieve goals—many sub-functions have been identified with 
labels like planning, coordination, sequencing, and monitoring.64 In the 
category of memory there is short-term memory, long-term memory, and 
working memory.65 Any comprehensive “toolbox” to measure cognitive 
function must take into account these, and many other, aspects of cognition. 
Shen identifies a long list of existing and reliable neuropsychological tests 
aimed at different cognitive dimensions.66 These include two tests readers may 
recognize: the Mini-Mental State Exam (MMSE) (measuring general cognitive 
impairment);67 and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale IV (WAIS IV) 
(general intellectual ability).68 Shen also lists many more instruments readers 
probably will not recognize: the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (general 
cognitive impairment),69 the Test of Premorbid Functioning (baseline general 
cognitive ability and memory),70 the Wechsler Memory Scale IV (auditory, 
visual, and working memory),71 the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System 
(idea assessment, focus, inhibition, flexible thinking, verbal fluency, problem 
solving, creativity, rule following, visual perception speed, pattern 
recognition),72 the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (flexible thinking),73 the 
Booklet Category Test (concept formation and abstraction),74 the California 
Verbal Learning Test (verbal learning and memory),75 and the Validity Indicator 
Profile (designed to detect cognitive malingering).76 Shen even delves into the 
possibility of looking for biomarkers using genetics, biochemical testing, and 
even neuroimaging as part of these assessments.77 
 
 64 See Shen, supra note 1, at 250–51. 
 65 See generally Nelson Cowan, What Are the Differences Between Long-Term, Short-
Term, and Working Memory?, in 169 PROGRESS IN BRAIN RESEARCH 323 (Wayne S. Sossin 
et al. eds., 2008). 
 66 Shen, supra note 1, at 297–304. 
 67 Id. at 298–300. 
 68 Id. at 301. 
 69 Id. at 299–300. 
 70 Id. at 301. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Shen, supra note 1, at 302. 
 73 Id. at 302–03. 
 74 Id. at 303. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 303–04. 
 77 Id. at 304–05. Biomarkers are data—from DNA, blood, or neuroimaging—that have 
become associated statistically with the risk of developing some condition. See Richard 
Mayeux, Biomarkers: Potential Uses and Limitations, 1 NEURORX 182, 182–83 (2004), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC534923/pdf/neurorx001000182.pdf [https 
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The biggest academic challenge in building the toolbox will be to select a 
set of tests that is specifically tuned to the job of judging. The cognitive tools 
required to be a stand-up comic, for example, are likely to be quite different than 
those required to be a judge. Even within the profession of judging, the cognitive 
demands of a trial judge are likely different from the cognitive demands of an 
appellate judge. Shen quite readily and wisely admits that this toolbox-building 
step will be so critical that before anything else is done to advance his proposal 
a group of experts will need to be convened—presumably, psychologists and 
neuroscientists but also judges—to identify possible testing methods.78 
The toolbox will not only have to reliably measure judge-related aspects of 
cognition, it will have to do so under the practical constraints of time and cost. 
These assessments cannot take too long, or judges will never accept them, and 
judicial administrators or legislatures will never mandate them. And they cannot 
be too expensive, or the requiring authorities will not pay for them. My own 
guess is that time and cost will be the biggest impediments to any widespread 
adoption of this plan. 
I am not an expert on any of these neuropsychological tests, but I have talked 
to people who are, including neuropsychologists who have performed some 
assessments I have ordered. I understand from them that even the most basic 
assessments will be costly and time consuming. A bare bones cognitive 
battery—using, for example, just the MMSE, the Montreal Cognitive 
Assessment, and the WAIS IV—will cost at least $1000 and take about two 
hours to administer. Now imagine this time and these costs spread over an entire 
judiciary. And imagine the increased time and costs if a few other tests are 
thrown into the toolbox. 
Shen anticipates judge resistance to using biomarkers to predict cognitive 
decline, on the theory that judges will be uncomfortable submitting to 
probabilistic instruments.79 But I am actually more sanguine on this front. 
Judges reason probabilistically all the time—from questions of whether a 
particular drug caused a particular individual plaintiff to have a given disease or 
condition, when the only scientific evidence is group data, to whether a 
collection of facts proves a proposition by a preponderance. The bigger problem 
with biomarkers, in my judgment, will be time and cost. I understand the cost 
of genetic testing has plummeted over the years, as I presume is also true of the 
 
://perma.cc/J5ME-546Q]. Unlike other clinical instruments, which measure existing 
cognitive abilities, biomarkers assess future risk. Shen, supra note 1, at 292. So, for example, 
a cognitive biomarker might predict that an assessed judge’s existing cognitive abilities 
might decline more (or less) rapidly over time than average. Because they are predictions 
about the future, the use of biomarkers has raised a slew ethical issues, including who should 
be able to obtain their predictive information and on what conditions. Id. at 306–08. 
 78 Shen, supra note 1, at 290.  
 79 See id. at 306–08. 
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detection of biomarkers by biochemical testing.80 And recovering these two 
biomarkers should not add significantly to overall testing time, requiring only a 
blood draw.81 But I know from my own experiments that neuroimaging is still 
very expensive and also takes lots of time.82 
Shen assumes some of the costs of his proposed cognitive assessment will 
be covered by existing health insurance plans.83 But I am not at all sure about 
that, given the vagaries of individual health insurance policies and plans and 
their interactions with a very complex regulatory universe. Will the fact that 
assessments are required change whether they are covered under some health 
insurance policies or plans? Will it matter who requires them—legislatures, or 
chief judges, or justices? Will the people doing the assessments have to be part 
of a plan’s provider network? What about insurers who provide their own self-
contained medical care, like Kaiser Permanente? 
I do agree with Shen’s underlying assumption: no judicial officer will ever 
order mandatory cognitive assessments if their individual judges will have to go 
out-of-pocket to pay for those assessments.84 And legislatures could not 
constitutionally force judges to pay for them, since doing so would effectively 
reduce judicial pay.85 In any event, I think the problem of cost is a more 
significant problem than Shen is willing to admit, and it will raise complicated 
questions that will need much more careful consideration.  
When and if we can develop reasonably priced and efficient assessment 
tools, I think the most delicate and important decision that will then need to be 
made is the selection of the entity that will order and then manage the assessment 
program. That entity selection could affect everything from whether the 
program will be constitutional, to whether judges will buy into it, to the 
confidentiality of its assessments. 
 
 80 Ellen Sheng, Genetic Testing Is Coming of Age, but for Consumers It’s Buyer 
Beware, CNBC (July 17, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/12/genetic-testing-is-
coming-of-age-but-for-consumers-its-buyer-beware.html [https://perma.cc/8A4E-Z99G].  
 81 But in fact, it will probably add significantly to the time of the assessment, if our 
judges have to report to a neuropsychologist’s office for cognitive testing and to a doctor’s 
office or hospital for a blood draw. Maybe this suggests using psychiatrists, who presumably 
could do both, but I have no idea how many practicing psychiatrists are proficient in 
administering neuropsychological tests. I know from my own experience that very few 
psychiatrists I have appointed do their own neuropsychological testing, but there are a few. 
 82 Granted, most research scanning is functional scanning, while I presume biomarker 
scanning will be structural. But even structural scanning takes time—just think of the last 
time you or a loved one had an MRI at a hospital. On the other hand, it appears that much 
quicker and more affordable scanning, and even some kinds of remote neuroimaging, may 
be on the horizon. See Kelly Servick, Cheap, Portable Scanners Could Transform Brain 
Imaging. But How Will Scientists Deliver the Data?, SCIENCE (Apr. 16, 2019), https:// 
www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/04/cheap-portable-scanners-could-transform-brain-
imaging-how-will-scientists-deliver-data [https://perma.cc/P7YE-P35L]. 
 83 Shen, supra note 1, at 296. 
 84 Shen, supra note 1, at 296. 
 85 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 2. 
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The first and most important choice will be whether these proposals should 
be made to legislatures by way of proposed legislation to mandate and fund the 
testing, or to judiciaries, through their chief judges and chief justices, with 
funding coming out of general judicial budgets. I can even imagine some 
combination—with legislation mandating the assessments but deferring to 
judiciaries to create the machinery to accomplish them. 
I am no expert on the politics of legislation, but it seems that until there is 
some widely reported public scandal about some demented judge doing 
something terrible, the average legislature will not have much of an appetite for 
adopting mandatory testing, let alone paying for it. On the other hand, Shen does 
report on efforts in a few states to raise or even eliminate state mandatory 
judicial retirement,86 and it seems to me that an individualized assessment 
requirement could be a perfect complement to those efforts. 
As for federal judges, I think it is a good bet that Congress will never enter 
this fray of mandatory judicial cognitive assessments, based on its past failed 
attempts to impose mandatory retirement,87 and especially in the current highly 
divided political climate. Shen labels as an example of “momentum” a recent 
effort by former Congressman Darrell Issa to mandate cognitive testing of 
federal judges.88 But that effort didn’t even get out of the Judiciary 
Committee.89 
Where congressional or state legislative prospects seem dim, proponents 
could still sell this idea to chief judges and chief justices. I have not done any 
analysis of their authority across the relevant jurisdictions, but my guess is that, 
as chief administrators of their judiciaries, most chief judges and chief justices 
could adopt Shen’s proposal at the stroke of a pen via chief judge or chief justice 
directives. This route, if available, has lots of other advantages over legislation. 
These judicial CEOs are already the authoritative source of most existing 
formal judicial conduct commissions or committees.90 Using those existing 
architectures to implement this testing will not only have the benefit of 
leveraging those architectures already designed to deal with highly confidential 
information, it will also avoid the politics of legislation.91 Judicially based 
assessment programs will also avoid the shadows of unconstitutionality lurking 
in any legislatively mandated system, as well as judges’ natural institutional 
resistance to any kind of inter-branch force. They would also go a long way 
toward solving any issues of individual judge buy-in. 
Judges, more than anyone else, expect that judicial orders will be followed, 
and we are very practiced at following other judges’ orders, even ones with 
 
 86 Shen, supra note 1, at 245–48. 
 87 See supra text accompanying note 41. 
 88 Shen, supra note 1, at 311–12. 
 89 Id. at 312. 
 90 But not in the federal system, as a result of the federal Judicial Conduct and Disability 
Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–64 (2012), discussed generally in supra note 57 and 
accompanying text. 
 91 Though I admit not the politics of judicial administration. 
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which we disagree. Every day our trial court judgments are overturned by 
intermediate appellate courts, and every day supreme courts overturn 
intermediate courts. In many kinds of administrative contexts, we are trained 
and dedicated to follow the directives of our chief judges and chief justices. So, 
in this very narrow sense we have a population that is actually more malleable 
to these kinds of systemic assessment reforms than perhaps in any other segment 
of work life. If our chief judges and justices, or of course our legislatures, order 
us to comply, we will. 
Admittedly, chiefs themselves may be reluctant to adopt these kinds of 
mandatory assessment programs if they sense widespread disaffection among 
the judicial troops. But here, Shen’s proposal may enjoy an edge with chief 
judges and chief justices not enjoyed with rank-and-file judges or legislators. 
Chiefs tend to be older than other judges, and older certainly than state 
legislators, and my guess is that these older chiefs will tend to be much more 
interested in cognitive assessments. Chiefs are also the supervisors who in most 
jurisdictions have to deal informally with the issues of a cognitively disabled 
colleague, and should, therefore, be especially interested in having a cognitive 
assessment that backs up their opinion that a colleague should step down. 
Finally, I think chiefs are also likely to be receptive targets because if they 
do not step in and order cognitive assessments for the members of their own 
branch, they risk legislatures doing so, and all the inter-branch complications 
that come from that. 
There is one area where I might suggest that Shen’s proposal is too timid: 
the commitment that the assessment results will, without exception, only be 
shared with the assessed judge and never anyone else.92 The salient problem 
with cognitive decline, of course, is that the decline itself may impair our ability 
to recognize it in ourselves. I worry about those cases where judges are 
profoundly disabled, and where the assessments show they are profoundly 
disabled, but the judges simply refuse to accept their condition. In those extreme 
cases, perhaps the process should recognize a limited exception to 
confidentiality and allow chief judges and chief justices access to the assessment 
results. The chiefs could use the data from the assessments informally to try to 
cajole an incompetent judge into resigning or retiring. And perhaps the chiefs 
should even be empowered to share the data with disciplinary/impeaching 
authorities if their efforts to talk the incompetent judge into voluntarily stepping 
down fail. 
I admit that many details would have to be worked out to implement such 
an exception to confidentiality. Perhaps the neuropsychologists administering 
the test results could themselves be authorized to release extremely bad results 
to chiefs. Perhaps chiefs could have all results on an anonymous basis and be 
given the authority to obtain the names of any extreme outliers. 
I don’t want to press this criticism too strongly. I appreciate that Shen has 
made the judgment call that to release this information to anyone but the 
 
 92 See Shen, supra note 1, at 283. 
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assessed judge may make the proposal so unpalatable that it is simply not worth 
the effort.93 But, of course, that depends on two factors: 1) the number of 
incompetent judges who simply will not step down on their own, even with the 
enlightening benefit of their own assessments; and 2) how unpalatable an 
exception to confidentiality will really be. 
As to the former factor, Shen acknowledges that there is an ongoing debate 
about the effectiveness of informal mechanisms to cajole judges to step down, 
but that the debate is largely uninformed with any actual data.94 I suggest that 
much more attention needs to be paid to this open empirical question before we 
can categorically assume there is no need to breach confidentiality because the 
informal system will work just fine if boosted with assessment data shared only 
with the judge in question. 
As to the latter factor, I repeat my contention that we judges are a strange 
combination of fierce lone wolves when it comes to the other two branches, in 
particular any attempt by those other branches to interfere with judicial process, 
but pretty much compliant soldiers when it comes to the orders of our judicial 
superiors. If proponents of this plan can get chief judges and chief justices to 
agree to the kind of limited exception to confidentiality I suggest, I think most 
judges will go along with it. 
Finally, there is one aspect of Shen’s plan I found too aggressive: forcing 
judicial applicants, in addition to sitting judges, to undergo this cognitive 
assessment.95 There are several problems I see mandating cognitive assessments 
at the application stage. 
First, and to my mind most important, there is simply no reason to require 
judicial applicants to undergo cognitive assessments. If the idea is to get an early 
baseline, we can require judges to complete an assessment sometime in their 
first year on the bench. Requiring these assessments at the application stage is 
not only unnecessary, it is significantly complicating. 
Who will mandate them? If, as I have suggested, the assessments are best 
mandated by chief judge or chief justice directive, then expanding them to 
judicial candidates may well require the involvement of other institutions, 
including legislatures. This could be especially complicated in pure election 
states, or even in retention states. I imagine no other candidates for elected office 
in any jurisdiction must be cognitively vetted. Why judges? And then why is 
that information not made available to the public, when it will at least look like 
the whole point of it is to inform voters? Legislatively imposed assessment 
requirements at the application stage might also be unconstitutional to the extent 
they add to the established qualifications for judges set forth in that 
jurisdiction’s constitution. 
And who pays for the assessment at the application stage? Would health 
insurance policies or plans pay for these assessments when, in some sense, they 
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really are voluntary—since the candidate is voluntarily applying to be a judge? 
I doubt we want to erect a thousand-dollar-or-more barrier to entry for judicial 
candidates, even if we constitutionally could. Must the persistent applicant 
undergo an assessment every time he or she applies? 
The costs of expanding this assessment regimen from sitting judges to 
judicial applicants, whoever will ultimately bear that cost, will be enormous. 
For every sitting judge, there must be dozens and dozens of applicants in 
appointment and retention states.96 Do we require cognitive assessments of all 
of them, or only those that make the interview stage? The federal definition of 
“applicant” can also be a problem. Once a candidate’s name is sent by his or her 
local senators to the Senate, the Senate begins the vetting process by having the 
presumptive nominee fill out an extensive questionnaire.97 We could require the 
cognitive assessment at that stage. But those presumptive nominees are still just 
presumptive, and many may not clear the White House interview and thus never 
become actual nominees.98 
For all these reasons, I think Shen’s proposal will be better served if it is 
focused on the group we care about—judges—and not on judicial applicants. 
There will be plenty of opportunity to assess those applicants when and if they 
become judges. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Shen’s proposal that judges undergo periodic cognitive assessments is 
important and timely. It needs attention to many details, as Shen readily 
admits.99 But once some of the most important of those details are worked out—
including the assessment tools to use and the branch to which the proposal will 
be presented—it should be taken seriously. My guess is that chief judges and 
chief justices, at least, will be receptive, even if only to beginning a dialogue 
that might eventually lead to widespread acceptance. 
 
 96 Retention elections ask voters to vote whether the incumbent judge should remain in 
office for another term. See generally Retention Election, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballot 
pedia.org/Retention_election [https://perma.cc/C6LC-XKYB]. Judges in these elections 
do not face opponents and are removed from office only if a large percentage of the electorate 
vote that they should not be retained. Id. 
 97 See supra note 55. 
 98 See supra note 55. 
 99 See, e.g., Shen, supra note 1, at 309 (discussing concerns about the constitutionality 
of judicial discipline beyond impeachment). 
